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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Leslie Alder (now known as Leslie Roberts, but referred to throughout
this Brief at "Leslie Alder" or "Ms. Alder") and Jackie Jones originally sued the
following named defendants: Miles, Inc., a corporation, AGFA Corporation, a
corporation, and Bayer Corporation, a corporation.
Counsel for Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones, on the one hand, and for the
originally named defendants, on the other hand, agreed that, for all purposes,
including but not limited to tort liability of any and all of the originally named
entities, and for simplicity's sake, the case could proceed against one named
entity only. That entity is the currently named defendant: Bayer Corporation,
AGFA Division (hereinafter "AGFA").
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appeal from a final Order of the Third J u d i c i a l District
C o u r t of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod). This C o u r t h a s
jurisdiction over this Appeal p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(3)(j).
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the District Court committed reversible error w h e n it

d e t e r m i n e d (1) t h a t AGFA owed Ms. J o n e s a n d Ms. Alder no d u t y of care; (2)
t h a t Ms. J o n e s a n d Ms. Alder c a n n o t establish c a u s a t i o n of a n y of their
d a m a g e s without proving the precise level of their chemical exposure; a n d (3)
t h a t Ms. J o n e s a n d Ms. Alder c a n n o t establish t h a t they were d a m a g e d
b e c a u s e t h e medical evidence regarding their illnesses is not b a s e d u p o n
inherently reliable scientific or medical foundation a n d is therefore
inadmissible; a n d w h e n it, accordingly, ordered s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t in AGFA'S
favor.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable s t a n d a r d of appellate review of s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t s h a s
been stated, by this Court, in Andreini v. Hultgren, 8 6 0 P.2d 9 1 6 , 9 1 8 (Utah
1993), a s follows:
In reviewing a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , we affirm only if there is no
genuine d i s p u t e of material fact a n d the moving party is entitled to
j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r of law. E.g., Estate Landscape a n d Snow
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 4 4
P.2d 3 2 2 , 324 (Utah 1992); Hill v. Seattle First N a t l Bank, 8 2 7
P.2d 2 4 1 , 242 (Utah 1992); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338
(Utah 1987). In reviewing a ruling on a motion for s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t , we review the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness. E.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 2 4 5 , 2 4 7 (Utah
1988).
1

The issue was preserved in the trial court by the filing of Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [R
1721-2229], at oral argument on that Motion, by the post-hearing submission
of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder [R 2342-2358], and by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal dated October 27, 2000 [R 2370-2371].
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT.

This case involves the claims of Jackie Jones and Leslie Alder for
compensation for the illnesses and damages they allegedly sustained during
their employment as radiography technologists at LDS Hospital. Ms. J o n e s
and Ms. Alder allegedly developed serious and permanent illnesses over the
course of a two-year period following the relocation and reinstallation of AGFA's
Curix Compact Daylight Processing machine in a new, improperly ventilated
work area. AGFA participated in the relocation of its machine and was
responsible for its installation. AGFA is alleged, among other things, to have
been negligent with respect to the installation of its Curix machine in the
Mammography Department at LDS Hospital, and with respect to its failure to
warn Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder of the dangers involved in working near the
machine without adequate ventilation.
AGFA filed a motion for summary judgment contending that it owed Ms.
Alder and Ms. Jones no duty of care; that all of the illnesses complained of by
Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were Multiple Chemical Sensitivity; that Multiple
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Chemical Sensitivity is not a valid illness or disease entity; and that Ms. Alder
and Ms. Jones could not prove that they had been subjected to toxic "doses" of
harmful chemicals. That Motion was vigorously contested, on all fronts, by Ms.
Jones and Ms. Alder. Oral argument was held on that Motion. The Third
District Court (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod) took the matter under
advisement and ultimately granted that Motion. The District Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment is dated October 4, 2000. The Notice of Appeal
was filed in the District Court on October 27, 2000, and in this Court on
October 30, 2000.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND
In 1991, Tim Murray went to work for AGFA as a Field Service Engineer
for the state of Utah and was responsible for servicing AGFA products at LDS
Hospital in Salt Lake City. When Mr. Murray started working for AGFA, he
was required to study a series of Chemical Safety Modules and was tested on
the information contained in the Modules. The Modules repeatedly stressed
the danger of the inhalation of fumes from the chemicals used in the subject
processor. [R 1887] Mr. Murray acknowledged that he was aware of the
necessity of adequate ventilation in rooms where the processor was used. [R
1889-90] AGFA's installation guidelines specify a minimum air exchange rate
of 10 or 15 times the room volume per hour. Mr. Murray acknowledged that
one of the reasons why adequate ventilation is stressed is that it is important
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that chemical vapors put off by the processor be removed from the room. [R
1891]
Mr. Murray acknowledged that AGFA participated in the installation of
the processor in its new location. [R 1893-94] Mr. Murray testified that he
connected the processor to a possible exhaust vent in the ceiling of the new
room. [R 1870-71] 1 Notwithstanding Mr. Murray's participation in the
installation of the processor, and his serious doubts regarding a possible
"exhaust vent's" ability to exhaust fumes from the new room, Mr. Murray
admitted that he did not test the ventilation in the room. [R 1894]
Sometime subsequent to the installation of the processor in its new
location, Mr. Murray received complaints from Ms. Jones that she had lost her
voice and had tightness in her chest. [R 1892] After learning that Ms. Jones
was getting sick from the fumes in the room, Mr. Murray became aware that
the ceiling vent was not working properly and "wasn't exhausting a lot of air."
[R 1872] Mr. Murray acknowledged that AGFA installation guidelines apply to
him, as a technician and installer, and require him to be concerned with the
ventilation of the rooms where processors are installed. [R 1873] When Ms.
Jones and Ms. Alder became sick, Mr. Murray talked to other AGFA
representatives, including George Cervenka. [R 1874-77] Mr. Cervenka was
AGFA'S product specialist at that time and told Mr. Murray "to have the room
1

Pages 1870-1883 of the Record are out of order as they were inadvertently placed under
Exhibit B (excerpts from William Patrick Bendall's deposition) to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to AGFA'S Motion for Summary Judgment In fact, pages 1870-1883 of the Record
are pages from Tim Murray's deposition (excerpts of that deposition constitute Exhibit C to that
Memorandum in Opposition) and those pages should, as parts of the Murray deposition, be
read as falling between pages 1894 and 1895 of the Record
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checked." Mr. Murray did not check the ventilation in the room, in spite of Mr.
Cervenka's directive that he do so. [R 1877] Mr. Cervenka wanted Mr. Murray
to have the room checked to determine whether the ventilation was sufficient to
get the fumes out of the room. [R 1878]
Sometime in March 1995, Mr. Murray, at the Hospital's request, installed
an AGFA "vent kit" to try to improve the fume problems. The vent kit consisted
of internal PVC piping that connected with the machine's hose and ran u p to
the ceiling vent. [R 1879] Mr. Murray had by then become concerned that the
lack of ventilation was causing Ms. Jones' health problems.

[R 1883]

Notwithstanding his concern, Mr. Murray never inquired whether the hospital
conducted any tests on the ventilation of the new room. [R 1895] Mr. Murray
does not recall ever suggesting better venting to anyone at the hospital. [R
1896]
LDS Hospital's Pat Bendall has testified that AGFA was "in the loop" from
the beginning when Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder made their first complaints
regarding the ventilation problem in the room and, eventually, regarding their
health problems. [R 1854] Mr. Bendall relied on the expertise of the AGFA
people with respect to safely ventilating the workplace. [R 1855] AGFA never
conducted any tests to determine the ventilation or air-exchange rates in the
new room. [R 1865]
At the Hospital's request, Utah Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH)
inspected the subject Mammography processing area after an outside wall vent
was finally installed and reported that it at that time had a satisfactory air-
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exchange rate of twenty five air changes per hour. UOSH also confirmed that
the mammography room initially had only two air changes per hour. UOSH
noted that AGFA's Curix machine used a developer containing the chemicals
glutaraldehyde and hydroquinone, stating "[ejmployees may have been
sensitized to the chemicals in the fixer and the developer before the ventilation
system was changed."
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were employed by Intermountain Health Care
("IHC") at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah as Radiography Technologists
for 17 and 15 years respectively. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were, by reason of
their subject illnesses, required to discontinue their employment, and careers,
as radiography technologists in J u n e 1995.
From February 1993 through J u n e 1995, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder
worked as full-time radiography technologists with the processor in the new
location. [R 1899] Prior to February 1993, Ms. Alder was in generally good
health and had not experienced any symptoms that she attributes to her work
as an x-ray technologist. [R 1900-04] Prior to February 1993, with the
exception of a lower back problem and diabetes, Ms. Jones was also in
generally good health and had not experienced any symptoms that she
attributes to her work as an x-ray technologist. [R 1920-22, 1935]
After the processor was relocated to the new area in February 1993, Ms.
Jones complained that the air in her workplace seemed hot and stagnant. [R
1920-22] Ms. Jones' initial illness symptoms included hoarseness, difficulty
breathing and chest pains. Ms. Jones' symptoms eventually included watery
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eyes, red skin, nausea, muscle aches, dizziness, joint pain, ear-aches, runny
nose, confusion, memory loss, slow-healing and severe fatigue. Ms. Jones
testified that she did not begin to experience the full gamut of these symptoms
until sometime towards the very end of her career in 1995. [R 1938-41, 194446] Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones believe that they first connected their symptoms
to chemical exposure when another technician began complaining of the same
symptoms sometime in late 1994 or early 1995. [R 1910-11, 1942]
MEDICAL TESTIMONY/ RECORDS
a. Anthony Suruda, M.D., M.P.H.
Eventually, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were referred by their employer to
Anthony Suruda, M.D., M.P.H. for an examination to determine if they had
suffered from occupational exposure to chemicals. Dr. Suruda is employed at
the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and Environmental Health,
University of Utah, and diagnosed Ms. Alder as having Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity (MCS), possible asthma and a history of depression. Dr. Suruda
recommended that Ms. Alder not work in departments where glutaraldehyde is
used or where air from those departments is recirculated into the building. [R
1958-68] Dr. Suruda diagnosed Ms. Jones as having MCS, diabetes and
hypertension. Dr. Suruda recommended that Ms. Jones not work in
departments where glutaraldehyde is used or where air from those
departments is recirculated into the building. [R 1958-68] Dr. Suruda testified
that glutaraldehyde is a known irritant, and that he believes he smelled
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glutaraldehyde over the processor when he visited the workplace of Ms. Jones
and Ms. Alder. [R 1974]
b. Deborah Robinson, M.D.
Dr. Robinson, a medical doctor and Ms. Alder's primary care physician,
conducted a differential diagnosis of Ms. Alder. Dr. Robinson explained that in
order to perform a differential diagnosis, a physician must get a history from
the patient and rule out (to the physician's satisfaction) other potential
explanations for the patient's specific problem. [R 1986-88] Dr. Robinson
diagnosed Ms. Alder with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and MCS in association
with Fibromyalgia. [R 1977]
According to Dr. Robinson, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome is a compilation of
various symptoms that together constitute a diagnosis. She states that "there
have been reports dating back over a hundred years of this syndrome, b u t it
hasn't been formally recognized perhaps until the last five to ten years." CFS is
now, however, a recognized diagnosis. [R 1978] Dr. Robinson also testified
that Fibromyalgia is a rheumatological diagnosis, consisting of another
constellation of symptoms, without serological or a laboratory abnormality for
diagnosis. In spite of the lack of objective "laboratory" evidence of this
syndrome, she testified that it is a recognized diagnosis. [R 1979]
In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder has a problem in neurocognitive
function and has some dysfunction in her ability to think. Dr. Robinson h a s
independently analyzed the result of neuropsychogical tests administered to
Ms. Alder. According to Dr. Robinson, "there are demonstrable abnormalities
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in Ms. Alder's neuropsychometric testing that would suggest that she would
have difficulty in performing tasks she could previously do." [R 1980-82] Dr.
Robinson did not see anything in Ms. Alder's neuropsychological test results
that indicate she is malingering. [R 1983] In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms.
Alder's test results indicate to a reasonable degree of medical probability that
Ms. Alder suffered some form of chemical insult. [R 1984] Dr. Robinson
further opined, to a degree of medical probability, that there is a part of Ms.
Alder's brain that has been damaged. [R 1985]
In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder is disabled in terms of her ability to
function in the job she previously held because she cannot be exposed to
chemicals and that she is unable, by reason of the inconsistency of day-to-day
pain and fatigue, to report every day to a job from eight to five. [R 1989] Dr.
Robinson has opined that Ms. Alder's CFS was caused by chemical exposure in
her workplace and that MCS and Fibromyalgia co-exist with Ms. Alder's CFS.
Dr. Robinson testified that "[c]ertainly the chemical smell sensitivity and the
basic symptoms of Ms. Alder's Chronic Fatigue had an onset at the time of her
exposure." [R 1991-92]
The fact that the constellation of Ms. Alder's medical problems and
illnesses has been referred to as "MCS" does not alter Dr. Robinson's opinion
that Ms. Alder suffers from real illnesses and is disabled as a result thereof. [R
1994] Dr. Robinson testified that even though science has not yet defined the
pathway of the CFS or MCS disease processes, one can still conclude to a
reasonable degree of medical probability that those syndromes occur in
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association with certain exposures, and that, based upon Ms. Alder's history of
being exposed to chemicals in the workplace and then having an onset of
symptoms that meet the definition of CFS and MCS, one can reasonably
conclude to a degree of medical probability that Ms. Alder's conditions were
brought on by her exposure to chemicals in the workplace in which the AGFA
Curix machine was relocated. [R 1995]
c. Lucinda Bateman, M.D.2
Dr. Lucinda Bateman, Ms. Jones' primary care physician, has opined
that Ms. Jones was disabled from performing her regular job because of
chemical exposure. [R 1951-56] Dr. Bateman believes that Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity is a valid disease entity. [R 2003] In treating and diagnosing Ms.
Jones, Dr. Bateman reviewed medical records and reports prepared by Ms.
Jones 7 other physicians. [R 2004]
According to Dr. Bateman, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Fibromyalgia
can be caused by a chemical exposure. [R 2005] Dr. Bateman testified that
she saw no evidence of malingering on the part of Ms. Jones. [R 2006] Dr.
Bateman diagnosed Ms. Jones with MCS. Specifically, Dr. Bateman stated that
she believes Ms. Jones "is ill, and her symptoms fit under Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity the best." [R 2007] Dr. Bateman believes the most likely cause of
Ms. Jones' MCS is her chemical exposure in the workplace. [R 2008-09] Dr.
2

Dr. Bateman is a board certified general internist. She attended medical school at J o h n s
Hopkins and completed her residency at the University of Utah. Dr. Bateman describes herself
as a general internist with an interest in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity, Fibromyalgia and atypical neurologic illness. [R 2000-01] She specializes in illdefined chronic illnesses and has published on the subject of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. [R
2002]
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Bateman has opined that the proposition that the cause of Ms. Jones'
symptoms is her occupational exposure to chemicals is provable from the
standpoint that Ms. Jones was in her work environment for many years
without problems and then, when the Curix machine was relocated into the
new area with inadequate ventilation, she began to develop her current health
problems. [R 2010] Dr. Bateman has correlated Ms. Jones' symptoms to her
workplace exposure by reviewing Ms. Jones' history and the temporal
relationship that exists between the onset of her illness and the ventilation
problems in her workplace. [R 2011]
d. Janiece Pompa, Ph.D. 3
Dr. Pompa administered a series of neuropsychological tests to Ms.
Jones and prepared an evaluation based upon Ms. Jones' test results. Dr.
Pompa's findings and conclusions are as follows:
In summary, Ms. Jones displays significant cognitive deficits, which she
ascribes to exposure to toxic chemicals. There is no literature with
regard to the neuropsychological effects of exposure to hydroquinone and
glutaraldehyde, or x-ray processing fluid. In the case of solvent
exposure, neurological examination is usually normal, except in the most
severe cases. However, subclinical neuropsychological effects are often
seen earlier in the exposure history. These include headache, dizziness,
fatigue, parasthesias, pain, weakness, and memory disturbance. Severe
exposure is capable of causing dementia, involving deficits in memory,
judgment, abstract thought and other cortical functions, as well a s
changes in personality and behavior. Since Ms. Jones does complain of
many of these symptoms, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that
her neuropsychological deficits could have been caused by chemical
exposure. It is unlikely that her complaints constitute a pre-existing
condition, as her memory and attentional deficits are so pronounced that
3

Dr. Pompa is a licensed psychologist and specializes in the fields of Child Psychology and
Neuropsychology. She completed a minor in Neuropsychology in graduate school, a
predoctoral internship with a neuropsychology rotation and one year post-doctoral residency in
child neuropsychology at Primary Children's Medical Center. [R 2014]
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she would not have been able to keep a job, much less a supervisory
position.
[R 2022-36] The medical literature relied upon by Dr. Pompa provides a
general description of many of the common neuropsychological consequences
of chemical exposure in general. Based upon this literature, and on her
background, training, education, experience, and her work with Ms. Jones, Dr.
Pompa determined that Ms. Jones' pattern of cognitive deficits seemed to be
reasonably related to her chemical exposure. [R 2015]

Dr. Pompa h a s

testified that she believes, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that
Ms. Jones' cognitive deficits observed in Dr. Pompa's testing were caused by
the chemical exposure she suffered in her workplace. [R 2016-18]
e. Michael Gray, M.D., M.P.H.4
Dr. Gray has been a treating physician for Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. He
utilized the differential diagnosis method in evaluating and diagnosing the
health conditions of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. [R 2063] Dr. Gray diagnosed
Ms. Alder as having (1) glutaraldehyde exposure and toxicity; (2) activated

4

Dr. Gray, San Pedro Valley Medical Association, Benson, Arizona, completed his medical
degree in 1974 at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine. He then completed a threeyear residency in Internal Medicine at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. He also
obtained a Master's degree in Public Health and in 1978 was appointed the Director of
Occupational Medicine at the Arizona Center for Occupational Medicine. He also served as an
assistant professor of Internal Medicine and has published numerous articles. [R 2038-49]
Dr. Gray participated in the authorship of 13 monographs that were eventually distributed to
various medical schools nationwide for use in their curricula. One of the monographs
identified glutaraldehye as a chemical that was hazardous to hospital workers. [R 2052-58]
Although he is not certified, Dr. Gray has training in Industrial Hygiene; he also has training
and experience in the field of Neurology. [R 2059-60] A summary of some of the data Dr. Gray
has collected and that factored into his clinical assessment of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder was
published in the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Agency of Toxic Substances
Disease Registry in May, 1994. This publication was also peer-reviewed and edited. [R 2061].
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cellular immunity (immune toxicity), (3) toxic encephalopathy (mild to
moderate), (4) reactive airways disease, and (5) latex sensitivity (health care
related). Dr. Gray concluded that Ms. Alder was temporarily totally disabled.
[R 2103-09] Dr. Gray diagnosed Ms. Jones as having glutaraldehyde exposure,
immune toxicity with evidence of excessive auto immunity and toxic
encephalopathy by history. He advised Ms. Jones to stay off work and opined
that her condition constituted a total disability. He reviewed Ms. Jones' past
medical records and opined that "her symptoms and overall condition are
directly related to the exposures which she sustained to glutaraldehyde in the
workplace/' [R 2096-2102]
Dr. Gray concluded that because of the temporal relationship between
the onset of Ms. Jones' illnesses and her relocation to a work area with
inadequate ventilation substantiates, the clinical correlation, and the
differential diagnostic process results "in a diagnosis of x-ray developer reagent
induced immune toxicity with associated toxic encephalopathy." [R 2081]

The

laboratory tests Dr. Gray performed on Ms. Jones confirm, to his satisfaction,
that she is reactive to the chemical fumes in her workplace. [R 2083]
With respect to identifying the chemicals that have caused the illnesses
of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, Dr. Gray testified as follows:
It is my considered medical opinion, based on the differential diagnosis
and general clinical assessment of these two individuals, that their
exposure in the context in question to a mixture of chemicals emanating
from the developer were sufficient to do the job. Now we can speculate
on which of the components might have been more or less likely to
contribute to the reaction, but the bottom line is that the reality of the
situation was that they were exposed to a mixture, not to just one
compound.
13

[R 2085] (Emphasis added). He further testified:
After reviewing the materials in my files relating to Leslie Alder and
Jackie Jones in this matter and the environmental circumstances, I
believe that the mixture of chemicals, which included hydroquinone,
glutaraldehyde and sulfur dioxide and some amounts of ammonia,
created conditions necessary and sufficient to induce immunotoxicity in
both of these patients as they are manifesting and exhibiting, both in the
context of the symptoms they are describing and the neuropsych profiles
that have been generated regarding them. The deficits of which, I think,
related to those exposures. From that standpoint, I believe that we can
say that the aggregate impact of the exposure to the combination of
compounds in the manner in which the ingestions occurred did indeed
induce toxic encephalopathy.
[R 2086] (Emphasis added).
Dr. Gray believes it is highly significant that these two patients were able
to work for so many years in their field without problem and then, with the
relocation of their workplace to a room with inadequate ventilation, their
illnesses and problems began to arise. [R 2089]
f. Mark R. Cullen, M.D.5
Dr. Cullen testified that the diagnostic criteria for MCS are (1) that the
patient has been in stable, generally good health prior to some environmental
exposure; and (2) that there was some symptomatic response to the

5

Dr. Cullen is a Professor of Medicine in Public Health at Yale University School of Medicine
and the Director of the Yale New Haven Occupational and Environmental Medicine Program.
[R 2127] Dr. Cullen is also a medical consultant for the International Chemical Workers Union
and a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the University of Iowa Persian Gulf
Veterans Study, a former member of the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors and a member
of the DuPont Epidemiology Review Board. [R 2128] Dr. Cullen is board certified in Internal
Medicine and Preventive Medicine in the Occupational Medicine Subspecialty. [R 2126] Dr.
Cullen is a member of the American College of Physicians, American Public Health Association,
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, and Association of
occupational and Environmental Clinics. [R 2129] Dr. Cullen has performed studies and
published articles on Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and, in fact, "coined" that term. [R 2130,
2133]
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environmental exposure which reoccurs at lower levels of exposure. Dr. Cullen
further testified that the exposure does not have to be a sudden, acute event
and the next two diagnostic criteria for MCS have to do with what is known as
"generalization of the process" so that additional chemicals begin to bother the
individual and the pattern of symptoms expand. According to Dr. Cullen:
One of the things that always happens during this period is the
development of some central nervous system type complaints, lack
of concentration, confusion, dizziness, persistent headache. That's
kind of a hallmark. So it's not just respiratory or skin, it's now
something more systemic.
[R2132]
According to Dr. Cullen, MCS patients "are not making the symptoms
up, [they] are very real, often extremely intense, life ruining symptoms, and
therefore they have an underlying pathophysiologic basis." [R 2134] Dr.
Cullen testified that there are objective ways to verify or confirm patients'
subjective report of their symptoms. For example, the temporal relationship of
their reported symptoms to their exposure are objective data in support of their
subjective complaints. In addition, their behavior can provide objective
evidence of their subjective complaints, and their past medical histories can
provide objective evidence and validation that their subjective complaints arise
out of the exposure event. [R 2135-36] According to Dr. Cullen, chemicals
clearly play a role in causing MCS. [R 2137]
Dr. Cullen testified that just because the medical community may not
know everything there is to know about a disease entity doesn't make the
disease any less real. One example given by Dr. Cullen is multiple sclerosis.
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Similar to MCS, the medical community does not know enough about Multiple
Sclerosis to know what causes the disease or to know how to effectively
intervene to treat a n d / o r prevent the disease. This lack of knowledge does not,
however, make the disease any less real. [R 2138] Dr. Cullen testified that
when treating MCS patients, it is important to perform a differential diagnosis.
He further testified that a differential diagnosis does not involve distinguishing
among exposures to different irritants to determine which irritant was the
causative factor. In fact, he indicates that this is a singularly unrewarding
task and is of no value. [R 2140-41]
According to Dr. Cullen, glutaraldehyde and hydroquinone are irritating
materials. In his opinion, there is significant circumstantial evidence that Ms.
Alder and Ms. Jones were exposed to levels of one or both of these chemicals
well in excess of their irritation thresholds. [R2157]
Dr. Cullen testified that Ms. Alder's respiratory complaints, central
nervous system complaints, and severe fatigue, triggered by intermittent
periodic exposures to low level environmental irritants, make it appropriate to
call her an MCS patient. Dr. Cullen believes that Ms. Alder's Fibromyalgia
diagnosis is related to her MCS and is part of that disease entity. [R 2158-60]
In Dr. Cullen's opinion, the record makes clear that Ms. Alder was working for
more than a year in a problematic environment, and "the association between
environmental exposures at low level and the triggering of symptoms is the sine
q u a n o n o f M C S . " [R 2161-62]

16

In formulating his opinions regarding Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, Dr.
Cullen reviewed extensive medical records and spoke with each of them. [R
2168-69]

He testified that one of the hallmarks of MCS is that the patient

does not improve once the initial exposure is remedied. It is of no surprise to
him that Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's symptoms and medical conditions did not
improve once the ventilation problem was corrected. Once a person develops
MCS, any improvement in the ventilation is too little, too late:
The problems that MCS patients have are not dose related. In the
normal scheme of things the triggers vastly exceed their thresholds
for response . . .they react to such relatively low levels of things
that improving ten or a hundredfold the air quality is not
important to them. It's not enough. It doesn't make much
difference.
[R 2173-74]
Dr. Cullen testified that Ms. Alder could not possibly return to work as a
radiographer and that there is good evidence that the ventilation in the subject
workplace was woefully inadequate and he feels confident that "one of the
chemicals involved in development, or all of them together, were important
contributing features here". [R 2176] Dr. Cullen opined that Ms. Alder
suffered functional neuropsychological impairments as a result of her MCS. [R
2179]
Dr. Cullen also performed a differential diagnosis of Ms. Jones. [R 2181]
He concluded, from that diagnosis, that she suffers from MCS, [R 2181], and
that her major chronic symptoms are muscle pain, impaired memory and
fatigue [R 2182 ], and that her respiratory and voice symptoms and loss of
balance occur with exposure to irritants. [R 2182]
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Dr. Cullen testified that the onset of MCS is always associated with some
chemical irritation or other chemical exposure or reaction. [R 2187] Ms. Jones'
positive reaction to a non-blind challenge test using glutaraldehyde supports
Dr. Cullen's diagnosis that Ms. Jones suffers from MCS. [R 2188] He further
testified that Ms. Jones' negative test result for classic allergens on a skin and
lung test is also supportive of his diagnosis because it rules out the possibility
that Ms. Jones' symptoms are the result of an allergy or asthma condition [R
2188], and that Ms. Jones' neuropsychological test results indicate a pattern
that is commonly seen in patients with MCS. [R 2190]
Dr. Cullen wrote:
It appears virtually unquestionable from the contemporaneous
record of complaints acknowledging the environment that the
workplace environment of Ms. Alder resulted in significant
respiratory and dermal irritation on a daily basis resulting in
headache, severe upper respiratory congestion and discomfort,
intermittent skin burning and fatigue. This constellation would
fall at the extreme end of the condition now most commonly known
as "Non Specific Building Related Illness" resulting from work in a
poorly ventilated environment with multiple irritating substances
present.
It also appears evident from the clinical record . . . that the patient
developed depression, likely reactive and in response to physical
illness.
. . . although most individuals suffering from repeat insults from
upper respiratory irritants and suffering from the syndrome of
"Non Specific Building Related Illness" do improve coincident with
environmental improvements . . . Ms. Alder's illness appears to
have been complicated prior to her removal from the work
environment by the syndrome of "Multiple Chemical Sensitivities."
Although the underlying basis for this complication remains
uncertain in the scientific literature, it is overwhelmingly the best
explanation for the exacerbation of symptoms through 1995, the
development of symptomatic responses around environments
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outside her work are and the development of more chronic and
persistent problems such as fatigue and musculoskeletal pain.
[R 2204-07] Dr. Cullen also opined that:
. . . based on my experience with a very large number of similarly
affected [patients], subjected throughout my clinical practice and
research over the past decade and half at Yale, it would be my
impression that Ms. Alder will not tolerate significant periods of
time in environments that are characterized by significant
chemical use and poor air quality. This may largely preclude her
ability to work at her chosen profession and may even preclude
working in any hospital environment, again based on my
experience.
[R 2204-07]
With respect to Jackie Jones, Dr. Cullen made conclusions, after he
completed her differential diagnosis, similar to those he made regarding Ms.
Alder. Specifically, Dr. Cullen found:
Based on the evidence regarding air quality between 1993 when
Ms. Jones' unit moved and 1995 when she discontinued work, it
appears evident that Ms. Jones was exposed repeatedly to irritating
industrial chemicals at levels substantially above those able to
cause mucosal irritation and associated symptoms. The headache,
difficulty concentrating, and upper respiratory symptoms
particularly the hoarseness which she experienced during this time
period, I believe can be directly attributable to those exposures as
was suggested by almost all of the contemporaneous evaluations
and supported by physical examination done at the time.
[R 2200-03] Dr. Cullen also opined that Ms. Jones' increasing
symptomatology, including a severe systemic component of fatigue, difficulties
with concentration, muscle aches and depressive symptoms, occurred even
after the remediation at her work area and persisted even after she was
removed altogether from the work environment and:
This pattern of intensifying symptoms occurring around and triggered
by a range of environmental odors and low level chemical irritants in
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an individual who has suffered from a two year occupational illness . .
. is most consistent with a complication known as Multiple Chemical
Sensitivities (MCS).
[R 2200-03]
Dr. Cullen acknowledged that there is considerable debate in the medical
literature as to "the path of physiologic base for this complication"—not as to
its existence. Based upon his review of the records and all the information
available to him, Ms. Jones meets, in Dr. Cullen's opinion, the clinical criteria
for the MCS disorder. [R 2200-03]
Dr. Cullen also opined that "Ms. Jones will not likely succeed in
returning to her prior occupation based both on her neuropsychological
impairments as well as her reactivity to the chemical environment" and that it
is "unlikely that she will succeed in returning to work in a hospital
environment, again because the frequent nature of environmental irritants in
that environment." [R 2200-03] Dr. Cullen testified that he holds the opinions
expressed in his reports on Leslie Alder and Jackie Jones to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. [R 2194]
Dr. Cullen does not consider the subject of MCS to be "new science" in
the scientific community. Indeed, according to Dr. Cullen this illness is the
subject of at least 200 peer scientific literature publications written within the
last decade. [R 2194] Dr. Cullen testified that "there is a preponderance of
scientific observation and scientific literature suggesting that this pattern of
illness is well described and describable." [R2195] Dr. Cullen has no doubt
that the onset of illnesses suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder resulted from

20

the chemical exposure they suffered in their workplace. Based upon his review
of the records, it is his opinion that the chemical exposure in this case is well
documented. [R2197]
Dr. Cullen testified that the cause of MCS, "chemical exposure", is
known, and that what is not yet understood in the medical community is what
the exact pathway is between the first set of events [the chemical exposure] and
the latter syndrome that develops. He does not, however, believe that the
actual condition of MCS is in dispute, and it is his opinion that these women
have the condition. [R 2195-97] Dr. Cullen testified that MCS is a distinct
clinical syndrome that has reasonable criteria for diagnosis. [R 2198]
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

AGFA owed Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder several duties of care. AGFA had a
duty to use reasonable care in the installation of the Curix machine in its new
location, including the obligation to determine whether adequate ventilation
was being provided. AGFA undertook the duty of installing the Curix machine
in its new location in February 1993. It had a duty to exercise reasonable care
in completing the task.
AGFA also had a duty to provide safe equipment. At least as a matter of
triable fact, AGFA knew or should have known that its machine was not safe
for use in the new, inadequately ventilated, mammography room and owed Ms.
Jones and Ms. Alder a duty of care not to provide the equipment without first
making it safe for its intended use. This duty, at least as a matter of triable
fact, required AGFA to refrain from installing its machine in the badly
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ventilated workplace; promptly to place an available, AGFA-made "vent kit" on
the machine to assist in venting the toxic fumes; a n d / o r to advise the hospital
that the AGFA machine could be used only in an area with better ventilation.
AGFA had a duty to see that its machine was not operated in unsafe
conditions. AGFA used and allowed its Curix machine to be used when it knew
or should have known that the machine was inappropriate to be operated in
areas that lacked adequate ventilation, and that operation under those
conditions would involve an unreasonable risk of harm to Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder.
AGFA owed a duty to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, by virtue of its
contractual relationship with their employer, regarding the installation and
servicing of the Curix machine. The reasonable performance of its contract
with IHC required AGFA to properly install and service the Curix machine for
the safety of IHC's employees who worked in the Mammography unit, including
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder.
AGFA also owed a duty to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder to warn them of the
risks of working near the Curix machine without adequate ventilation. AGFA'S
unquestionable abject failure to warn Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder regarding the
risks associated with their use and operation of a piece of equipment AGFA
provided, installed, and serviced subject AGFA to liability.
With respect to illness causation, the inability of Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder to establish the exact levels of chemicals to which they were exposed over
the course of the two-year period they worked in the new Mammography
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department is no fault of their own and is not fatal to their claims. Standards
created by governmental and/or industrial agencies are not necessarily
"scientific" in nature and do not stand for the proposition that exposure to
levels lower than those established as "standards" cannot cause injury.
Furthermore, Ms Jones' and Ms. Alder's medical experts have opined that, in
addition to objective evidence of exposure to chemicals in the workplace, the
temporal relationship between the inadequate ventilation of the workplace and
the onset of symptoms establishes a causal connection between exposure to
chemical fumes and the illnesses suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder.
The testimony of the medical experts is based upon reliable, scientific
methods and is not inadmissible under this Court's Rimmasch decision or any
other controlling rule of law. In determining the admissibility of the medical
testimony, the District Court could appropriately have concerned itself only
with the methods upon which an expert opinions are based; it should not have
judged the credibility of the opinions themselves. That task is specifically
reserved for the trier of fact. In this case, the techniques and methods utilized
by the witnesses in question are not "novel" or "new".
The District Court committed reversible error when it granted AGFA'S
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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V.
I.

ARGUMENT

AGFA OWED MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER DUTIES OF CARE.
A.

AGFA HAD A DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE IN THE
INSTALLATION OF THE CURIX MACHINE IN ITS NEW
LOCATION, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE
WHETHER ADEQUATE VENTILATION WAS BEING PROVIDED.

Under its contract with IHC, AGFA was responsible for the installation
and servicing of the Curix machine. In February 1993, when IHC determined
to relocate the machine in its new mammography department, AGFA was called
in to assist with, and did assist with, the installation of the Curix machine in
its new location. AGFA thus undertook the responsibility of appropriately
installing the Curix machine. Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to
the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A (emphasis added). This
Restatement provision clearly applies to the facts of this case. As demonstrated
by the testimony of AGFA's Service Representative, Tim Murray (see discussion
and record citations set forth at pages 3-5, above), AGFA failed, in performing
the undertaking of installing the Curix machine in its new location (at least as
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a matter of triable fact), to use reasonable care in several respects, thereby
increasing the risk of harm to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder.6
Under Section 324A, when AGFA undertook to install the Curix machine
in its new location, it assumed all duties attendant thereto, including the duty
to see to it that there was adequate ventilation for the Curix machine to be
safely operated in its new location. There is, at a minimum, a triable issue of
material fact with respect to whether IHC relied upon AGFA'S expertise,
training and knowledge with respect to the ventilation needs in the workplace.
According to IHC's William Patrick Bendall, IHC, through Mr. Bendall, relied
on the expertise of the AGFA people with respect to safely ventilating the
workplace. [R 1855]
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that AGFA had a duty to use
reasonable care in the installation of the Curix machine. That duty included,
at a minimum, the duty to ascertain whether there was adequate ventilation for
the safe operation of the machine in its new location.

6

Mr. Murray failed to act reasonably in his installation of the Curix machine. He failed to test
the ventilation in the room when he initially installed the Curix machine, failed again to test
the ventilation in the room when he developed concerns that the ceiling vent was not working
properly, and failed once against to test the ventilation in the room after Plaintiffs began
complaining about their health and he was specifically instructed to test the ventilation in the
room by Agfa product specialist, George Cervenka. He admits that he became concerned that
the lack of ventilation was causing Ms. Jones' health problems but did nothing to remedy the
ventilation problems. In addition to the foregoing shortcomings, Mr. Murray admits that he
never inquired whether the Hospital conducted any tests on the ventilation of the new room or
followed up on any testing of his own.
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B.

AGFA HAD A DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE EQUIPMENT.

It is well established that a supplier of a chattel must exercise reasonable
care to make the chattel safe for its intended use. Section 392 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who supplies chattels is liable to those for whose use the chattel is
supplied, or to those whom he should expect to be in the vicinity of its
probable use for bodily harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by the persons for whose use the chattel is
supplied if the supplier failed to exercise reasonable care to make the
chattel safe for the use for which it was supplied .
(Emphasis added.) This rule of law, like most - if not all - of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, had been accepted by this Court. See, Reynolds v. American
Foundry & Mach. Co., 239 P.2d 209 (Utah 1952). In the present case, AGFA
supplied the Curix daylight processor machine. In order for the Curix machine
to be safely operated, there must be adequate ventilation provided to vent the
processing fumes from the workplace. Mr. Murray was aware of this fact and
admitted the same in his deposition. [R 1889-91] At least as a matter of
triable fact, AGFA knew or should have known that its machine was not
safe for use in the new mammography area. AGFA certainly seems to have
failed to exercise reasonable care to make the Curix machine safe for the use
for which it was supplied.
Another example of AGFA's probable violation of the duty referenced in
Section 392 has to do with an AGFA "vent kit" - part of the AGFA product line
at all times material hereto. The vent kit consisted of internal PVC piping that
connected with the machine's hose and ran up to the ceiling vent. When the
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Curix machine was reinstalled in its new location, it did not include this
equipment. As set forth above, AGFA had a duty to make sure the Curix
machine could be safely operated in its new location. AGFA did not, as a
matter of triable fact, exercise reasonable care in initially installing the Curix
machine without the benefit of the vent kit (something AGFA added much later,
after Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had become ill). The ventilation kit was
designed to exhaust chemical fumes emitted by the Curix machine and would,
at least as a matter of triable fact, have improved the ventilation conditions.
As Section 392 of the Restatement provides, AGFA'S duty not only
applies to those, such as IHC, to whom AGFA supplied its chattels, but also to
"those whom [AGFA] should expect to be in the vicinity of the chattel's use".
Consequently, it is clear that AGFA owed a duty of care to Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder, employees of IHC, under this particular Restatement provision.
C.

AGFA HAD A DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM USING ITS MACHINE,
AND ALLOWING ITS MACHINE TO BE USED, IN UNSAFE
CONDITIONS.

Section 307 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides as follows:
It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a human being or a
thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent,
inappropriate or defective that its use involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to others.
(Emphasis added.) AGFA used and allowed its Curix machine to be used
when it knew or should have known that the machine was inappropriate to be
operated in the subject workplace, which AGFA knew lacked adequate
ventilation, when AGFA knew that operation under those conditions would
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to those who worked in that workplace.
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AGFA'S Tim Murray had knowledge and training regarding the necessity of
adequate ventilation in the machine's operation. He knew, or should have
known, of the danger of adverse health effects from chemical fumes emitted
from the AGFA machine, and he had concerns, when he installed the machine
in the new location, regarding the adequacy of the ventilation. Based upon
such things as Mr. Murray's knowledge and training, and his suspicions
regarding the inadequacy of the ventilation, AGFA had a duty to refrain from
using its machine, and allowing its machine to be used in the subject
workplace. AGFA was, as a matter of triable fact, negligent in operating the
Curix machine, and allowing it to be operated, under the circumstances.
D.

AGFA OWED A DUTY TO MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER BY
VIRTUE OF ITS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR
EMPLOYER.

In Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,473 N.E.2d 421(111.
1986), tenants of a warehouse sued a security company that installed and
maintained a fire alarm system for another tenant. They alleged that the
defendant's negligent installation and maintenance of the system caused them
to suffer damages when a small, undetected fire became a major conflagration
that destroyed the warehouse. The trial court dismissed the tenants' action.
The appellate court reversed, holding that "defendant should have recognized
that the performance of its contractual obligations was necessary for the
protection of third parties. The fact that plaintiffs were not parties to the
contract did not negate the existence of a duty owed to them." 473 N.E. 2d at
427, judgment affirmed 493 N.E.2d 1022 (1986).
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Here, AGFA had a contractual relationship with IHC for the installation
and service of the Curix machine. The reasonable performance of its contract
with IHC, including properly equipping, installing, and servicing the Curix
Machine, was necessary for the protection of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder,
employees of IHC known by AGFA to be working in the subject workplace. As
in Scott, the fact that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were not parties to the contract
does not negate the existence of a duty owed to them.
Similarly, in Essex v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 399 A.2d 300
(N.J.Super. 1979), the plaintiff brought an action against the telephone
company when she fell over a telephone wire at the desk of her co-worker. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the telephone company and
the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding as follows:
[T]he defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiff, in that its activity had its
basis in a contract between the plaintiffs employer and the defendant,
negligent performance of which gave rise to a right of action by third
persons such as plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care in the installation
of telephones on the employer's premises in order to avoid damage or
injury to all within the zone of hazard created by its activity, and whether
it performed that duty was a questions for resolution by the jury.
399 A.2d at 302 (Emphasis added). It is clear that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder
were directly in the "zone of hazard" in their work with and near the Curix
machine. Thus, AGFA may be held liable to Plaintiffs for its negligent
performance of its contractual obligations to IHC, including, without limitation,
the appropriate equipping, installation of and servicing of the Curix machine.
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E.

AGFA HAD A DUTY TO WARN MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER
OF THE DANGERS OF WORKING NEAR THE CURIX MACHINE
WITHOUT ADEQUATE VENTILATION.

As stated, AGFA'S agent, Tim Murray, has admitted that he received
training and instruction regarding the importance of adequate ventilation to
the safe operation of the Curix machine, that he participated in the installation
of that machine although he had concerns regarding the adequacy of the
ventilation, and that he became even more concerned when Ms. Alder and
Ms. Jones began to experience health problems in the workplace. In spite of
his knowledge and concerns, he gave no warning to Ms. Jones or Ms. Alder,
or their employer regarding the risks of working near the Curix machine
without adequate ventilation.
Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
This Court has expressly approved, in Schneider v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822,
823 (Utah 1958), Section 388 of the Restatement of Torts. It is well accepted
that negligence can be founded on unsafe warning practices regarding the use
to which a chattel may be put. See, e.g., Hunnings v. Texaco Inc., 29 F.3d
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1480, 1483 ( l l ^ C i r . 1994); and Clarke Industries, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co.,
591 So.2d 458, 460-61 (Ala. 1991) (R 2343-2358). There can be no serious
dispute of the proposition that AGFA'S abject failure to warn of the risks
associated with Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's use and operation of a piece of
equipment AGFA provided, installed, and serviced, when it knew the machine
was being operated with inadequate ventilation, subjects AGFA to liability.
Based on one or more of the duty analyses set forth in this Part I of this
Argument, the District Court erred when it concluded that AGFA owed no duty
of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder.
II.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IS
ADMISSIBLE AND CREATES GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
WITH RESPECT TO CAUSATION AND DAMAGES,
In its Order granting summary judgment in favor of AGFA, the District

Court ruled that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder could not establish causation
because they could not prove that they were exposed to chemicals at any level,
let alone at toxic levels. The District Court also ruled that Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder could not establish that they had been damaged because the medical
evidence supporting their claims for damages is inadmissible. These rulings
are erroneous, as explained below.
A.

THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF MS. JONES' AND MS. ALDER'S
EXPERTS IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH LAW.

The District Court ruled that the testimony of Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's
treating health care providers and non-treating medical expert (Dr. Cullen)
should be excluded because some of those witnesses have referred to the host
of problems experienced by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder as "Multiple Chemical
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Sensitivity." The District Court ruled that, since MCS is not widely accepted in
the medical community as a valid disease entity, it is not a "scientifically
reliable",diagnosis. 7
In so ruling, the District Court ignored the constellation of longrecognized and well-accepted, stand-apart conditions with which Ms. J o n e s
and Ms. Alder have been diagnosed, as well as the limitations of the holding in
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). In Rimmasch, trial courts are
limited in their gate-keeping function to reviewing the methods and techniques
upon which an expert witness's conclusions and opinions are based. It cannot
examine or judge the opinions and conclusions drawn from the methods and
techniques employed; that assessment is the province of the jury. Id.
The physicians in question have utilized the time-honored technique of
"differential diagnosis" in reaching their opinions concerning these women's
illnesses. As explained hereinabove (see discussion appearing at pages 7-21),
this technique is considered to be a standard, scientifically reliable technique
in the medical community. It has been widely accepted by courts across the

7

It is important to understand that Ms Jones and Ms Alder have been diagnosed with a host
of separate ailments (including but not limited to sinus problems, respiratory problems,
fatigue, and cognitive deficits), apart from the MCS diagnosis It is undisputed that these
various conditions have long been recognized and accepted within the medical community as
valid medical conditions And the success or failure of this Appeal should (regardless of the
District Court's determination) by no means hinge on the question of whether MCS is a Valid
disease entity." A ruling that, as a matter of law, MCS is not a "valid disease entity" (which
Ms Jones and Ms. Alder contend would be an erroneous ruling) should go only to damages
and not be deemed to be fatal to Ms Jones' and Ms Alder's claims
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nation as a proper and valid basis for establishing a medical opinion.

The

District Court erred in excluding the medical testimony of the physicians.
1.

The Method of Differential Diagnosis Provides a Sound,
Scientifically Established Basis for a Medical Opinion.

In State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000), this Court made absolutely
clear what it meant in Rimmasch. This Court explained that the Rimmasch
analysis applies to the methods and/or techniques used by the expert in
arriving at his/her opinion, not to the expert's opinion itself. In making this
clarification, the Court stated:
Rimmasch simply requires that the scientific principles underlying the
expert's testimony be inherently reliable, not that the expert's actual
testimony be inherently reliable.
Adams, 5 P.3d at 644 (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted). See also: Kennedy
v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9 th Cir. 1998). In Kennedy, the court stated:
Judges in jury trials should not exclude expert testimony simply because
they disagree with the conclusions of the expert. The Daubert duty is to
judge the reasoning used in forming an expert conclusion. The test is
whether or not the reasoning is scientific and will assist the jury. If it
satisfied these two requirements, then it is a matter for the finder of fact
to decide what weight to accord the expert's testimony. In arriving at a
conclusion, the factfinder may be confronted with opposing experts,
additional tests, experiments, and publications, all of which may
increase or lessen the value of the expert's testimony. But their presence
should not preclude the admission of the expert's testimony—they go to
the weight, not the admissibility.
161 F.3d at 1230-31 (emphasis added).
It is also well established that the standards set forth in Rimmasch are
not intended to apply to all expert testimony. In Adams, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is
'based on newly discovered principles'." Adams, 5 P.3d at 644 (quoting
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Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396; see also: State v. Kellev, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah 2000)
(concluding Rimmasch is inapplicable where 'there is no plausible claim that
the type of expert testimony offered by the prosecution was based on novel
scientific principles or techniques'); Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah
1999) (refusing to even apply Rimmasch where expert's testimony was not
based on novel scientific principles or techniques). Rimmasch is inapplicable
in the present case inasmuch as the health care providers in question have
employed diagnostic methods and techniques that are standard and wellaccepted in the medical community as being scientifically reliable. For
example, Dr. Pompa administered a battery of neuropsychological tests that
have been used and accepted within the medical community for decades in
assessing the women's cognitive status. Similarly, the medical opinions given
by Drs. Robinson, Bateman, Suruda, Gray and Cullen are based upon the
differential diagnosis method of determining the cause of a patient's medical
condition. The differential diagnosis technique is well recognized and accepted
in the medical community as a standard and scientifically reliable method
upon which to base an expert opinion. (See discussion of medical evidence
appearing at pages 7-21, above.)
In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4 th Cir. 1999), the
plaintiff worked in a plant where he was required to work with rubber gaskets
that had been coated with talc for easier handling. During the course of
handling these gaskets, he claimed he was brought into contact with high
concentrations of airborne talc. He began to experience unrelenting sinus
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problems and was eventually required to undergo several sinus surgeries in an
attempt to alleviate his sinus pain. He claimed that the defendant's failure to
warn him of the dangers of breathing airborne talc proximately caused the
aggravation of his pre-existing sinus condition. The trial court allowed the
plaintiffs expert, Dr. Isenhower, to testify that in his opinion the sinus
problems experienced by the plaintiff were caused by the inhalation of airborne
talc in the workplace.
On appeal, the defendant argued that Dr. Isenhower's testimony should
have been ruled inadmissible because it was not based upon reliable, scientific
methodology:
. . . Dr. Isenhower had no epidemiological studies, no peer-reviewed
published studies, no animal studies, and no laboratory data to support
a conclusion that the inhalation of talc caused [the plaintiffs] sinus
disease. Further, [the defendant] continues, Dr. Isenhower did not have
any tissue samples indicating that talc was found in [the plaintiffs]
sinuses, nor did he have studies showing that talc, at any threshold
level, causes sinus disease. Instead, Dr. Isenhower merely relied on a
differential diagnosis—supported in part by the temporal relationship
between [the plaintiffs] exposure to talc and the problems he experienced
with his sinuses—in reaching the conclusion that [the plaintiffs] sinus
problems were caused by his exposure to talc from [the defendant's]
gaskets.
Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262. The defendant argued that neither a differential
diagnosis nor a temporal relationship between exposure and onset or
worsening of symptoms was sufficient to establish the reliability of
Dr. Isenhower's opinion. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.
In upholding the district court's admission of Dr. Isenhower's testimony,
the appellate court held that a "[differential diagnosis, or differential etiology,
is a standard, scientific technique . . ." Id, at 262 (emphasis added). The cases
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that recognize differential diagnosis as a valid and reliable scientific technique
upon which an expert may base an opinion are legion. See, e.g., McCullock v.
H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2 nd Cir. 1995); Glaser v. Thompson Med.
Co., 32 F.3d 969, 978 (6 th Cir. 1994} (recognizing that differential diagnosis is a
standard diagnostic tool used by medical professionals to diagnose the most
likely cause of illness, injury and disease); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 758 (3 rd Cir. 1994) (stating that the technique of differential
diagnosis "has wide acceptance in the medical community, has been subject to
peer review, and does not frequently lead to incorrect results/'); Heller v. Shaw
Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3 rd Cir. 1999) (concluding that a proper
differential diagnosis is adequate to support expert medical opinion on
causation and further noting that "differential diagnosis consists of a testable
hypothesis, has been peer reviewed, contains standards for controlling its
operation, is generally accepted, and is used outside of the judicial context");
Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C, Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383-85 (4 th Cir. 1995) (holding
that expert testimony by treating physician concerning the cause of the
plaintiffs liver failure—acetaminophen combined with alcohol—was admissible
despite the lack of epidemiological data); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d
1226, 1228-30 (9 th Cir. 1998) (holding district court abused its discretion in
excluding an expert opinion on causation based upon a differential diagnosis);
Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1 s t Cir.
1998)(determining that a differential diagnosis rendered expert opinion on
causation sufficiently reliable for admission); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140
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F.3d 381, 385-87 (2 nd Cir. 1998) (upholding determination that expert opinion
was reliable in part based on differential diagnosis); and Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that because
expert opinion was based on differential diagnosis, district court abused its
discretion in refusing to admit it.)
It is abundantly clear that the technique of differential diagnosis is a
widely accepted, reliable, scientific method upon which medical opinions may
properly be based, and the District Court erred in its implicit ruling to the
contrary.
Furthermore, a physician's testimony based upon a differential diagnosis
need not be supported by medical literature. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.,
61 F.3d 1038 (2 nd Cir. 1995), the plaintiff developed polyps in her throat after
being exposed to glue fumes in her workplace. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the medical testimony of the plaintiffs physician, based upon
a differential diagnosis of the plaintiffs illness, was admissible in spite of the
fact that the physician could not point to a single piece of medical literature
establishing that glue fumes cause throat polyps. 61 F.3d at 1043-44.

In

allowing the physician's testimony, the court held that "disputes as to the
strength of his credentials, faults in his use of differential etiology as a
methodology or the lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the
weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony." Id.
In Zuchowiczv. U.S., 140 F.3d 381 (2 nd Cir. 1998), the plaintiff developed
primary pulmonary hypertension ("PPH") eight months after taking an overdose
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of a prescription drug called Danocrine and died two years later as a result of
PPH. At trial the defendant attempted to exclude medical testimony t h a t the
overdose caused the plaintiff to develop the PPH that eventually resulted in her
death. In support of its contention that such testimony should be excluded,
the defendant argued that since Danocrine had never been previously linked to
PPH, any conclusion that the Danocrine overdose more likely than not caused
the plaintiffs illness was clearly erroneous. The Second Circuit disagreed.
In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the court stated
that "it is well established that causation 'may be proved by circumstantial
evidence' (citations omitted) and that 'the causal relation between an injury and
its later physical effects may be established by the direct opinion of a
physician, by his deduction by the process of eliminating causes other
than the traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical
question'/' Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 389 (quoting Shelnitz v.
Greenberg, 509 A.2d 1023, 1027 (Conn. 1986).
In Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3 rd Cir. 1999), the court
held as follows:
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible
nature of the Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the
jury in evaluating the ultimate credibility of an expert's opinion, we do
not believe that a medical expert must always cite published studies on
general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object
caused a particular illness. Cf. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d
1038, 1043 (2 nd Cir. 1995) (affirming admission of treating doctor's
testimony despite the fact that he "could not point to a single piece of
medical literature that says glue fumes cause throat polyps"). To so hold
would doom from the outset all cases in which the state of research on
the specific ailment or on the alleged causal agent was in its early stages,
and would effectively resurrect a Fme-like bright-line standard, not by
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requiring that a methodology be "generally accepted," but by excluding
expert testimony not backed by published (and presumably peerreviewed) studies.
167 F.3d at 155 (Emphasis added). In addition, the court explained that in the
actual practice of medicine, "physicians do not wait for conclusive, or even
published and peer-reviewed, studies to make diagnoses to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty/' Id. (Emphasis added.) The court found those
diagnoses to be valid stating as follows:
However, experience with hundreds of patients, discussions with peers,
attendance at conferences and seminars, detailed review of a patient's
family, personal and medical histories, and thorough physical
examinations are the tools of the trade, and should suffice for the
making of a differential diagnosis even in those cases in which peerreviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis of the
physician.
Id. (Emphasis added).
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9* Cir. 1998), the plaintiff
alleged that collagen injections caused her atypical systemic lupus
erythematosus (SLE). In holding that the medical expert's testimony that
collagen injections caused the plaintiffs SLE was supported by scientific
evidence, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Not knowing the mechanism whereby a particular agent causes a
particular effect is not always fatal to a plaintiffs claim. Causation can
be proved even when we don't know precisely how the damage occurred,
if there is sufficiently compelling proof that the agent must have caused
the damage somehow.
Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230 (Emphasis added).
In the present case, there is compelling evidence that the illnesses
suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder resulted from their exposure to chemicals
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in their workplace. Compelling evidence consists of their work histories,
medical histories, simultaneous onset of nearly identical symptoms, the
established lack of adequate ventilation in the subject workplace, and the
testimony of many of their treating physicians.
2.

Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's Subjective Complaints
and Self-Reporting Are Valid Basis for Differential
Diagnosis.

It is well established that a person's own subjective complaints and selfreporting of his/her own medical history provide a valid basis for a physician's
differential diagnosis. Any inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the subjective
information provided by the plaintiff properly constitute a subject of crossexamination and does not affect the admissibility of an opinion based upon a
differential diagnosis. See, Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008 (7 th
Cir. 1999). In Cooper, the plaintiff attempted to establish that he was suffering
from chronic pain syndrome ("CPS") and that this condition was caused by his
fall. The district court refused to admit the expert medical testimony
concluding that because the physicians relied on the plaintiffs self-reporting
about his past medical history as the basis for their diagnoses that the
plaintiffs fall caused his CPS, the physicians had no scientific basis for their
testimony.

In addition, the defendant argued:

. . . not all CPS patients can point to a particular event as the cause of
their condition and . . . emotional factors have been known to play a role
in the onset of the condition . . . Dr. Richardson had not taken into
account the possible effect of such other factors in [the plaintiffs] life on
the onset of the condition. Indeed . . . Dr. Richardson made no critical
evaluation of the cause of [the plaintiffs] CPS because it was not
necessary to his treatment of the condition that he know with any
certainty its cause . . . Dr. Richardson's "post hoc, propter hoc"
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determination of cause, although perhaps an acceptable methodology in
cases in which the mechanism of injury is understood, is not adequate in
cases such as this one in which that mechanism is not understood.
Cooper, 211 F.3d at 1020. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.
In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the Cooper court
stated that "here, a physician employed the accepted diagnostic tool of
examination accompanied by physical history as related by the patient." Id.
The Court further stated:
. . . the methodology of physical examination and self-reported medical
history employed by Dr. Richardson is generally appropriate. Although
[the defendant] disputes the acceptability of such an approach in the
case of conditions whose etiologies are less specific, it suggests no
alternative that could be employed by the conscientious clinical
physician in this situation. 8
Id. In the present case, the trial court concluded that since the etiology of MCS
is not well known or established, the medical testimony in this case should be
disregarded. That position was rejected by the Cooper court and should be
rejected in this case as well. The Cooper court acknowledged that a patient's
subjective complaints and self-reported medical history was a sufficient basis
for medical testimony regarding the patient's chronic pain syndrome. Id.
Furthermore, the Cooper court went on to say that the possibility of the
plaintiff's CPS being attributable to factors other than the fall, as well a s the
accuracy and truthfulness of the plaintiffs self-reported medical history, were
both susceptible to exploration on cross-examination by opposing counsel. Id.

8

It may be significant that the court admitted the medical testimony in spite of the fact that
CPS is not accepted by the entire medical community and has a vague and wide-ranging
etiology.
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Therefore, the defendant's contention that other conditions might have caused
his CPS "goes to the weight of the medical testimony, not its admissibility . . .
the proper method of attacking evidence that is admissible but subject to doubt
is to cross-examine vigorously, to present contrary evidence, and to give careful
instructions on the burden of proof." Id.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that differential diagnosis is a wellaccepted, scientific method of treating patients and provides a valid basis for
the admission of medical testimony. Consequently, the District Court erred in
ruling to exclude the testimony of Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's treating
physicians and medical experts who employed the differential diagnosis
method in their treatment of these women and based their medical opinions on
the same.

B.

THE INABILITY OF MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER TO
ESTABLISH THE EXACT LEVELS OF THEIR CHEMICAL
EXPOSURE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEM FROM
ESTABLISHING CAUSATION

The District Court erred when it concluded that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder
cannot establish causation without proving the exact level of chemicals to
which they were exposed. It is well established that Daubert-type opinions
emphasize that "causation need not be established to a high degree of certainty
for expert testimony to be admissible . . ." Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230 (citing
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 at 590 (1993)).
Indeed, "it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific
testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in
science." Id. Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's inability to establish the exact levels
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of chemicals to which they were exposed over the course of the two-year period
they worked in LDS Hospital's new Mammography department is through no
fault of their own and is not fatal to their claims. Standards created by
governmental a n d / o r administrative agencies are, at least arguably, the
product of a political process and not "scientific" in nature. (See, e.g., Dr.
Gray's testimony, R. at 2070-72). They do not even purport to stand for the
proposition that exposure to levels lower than those established as "standards"
cannot cause injury.
In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999), the
defendant argued that the medical expert's testimony should be excluded
because he had "no means of accurately assessing what level of exposure was
adequate to produce the sinus irritation [the plaintiff] experienced." 178 F.3d at
263. In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated the following truth:
But it must also be recognized that only rarely are h u m a n s exposed to
chemicals in a manner that performs a quantitative determination of
adverse outcomes. Human exposure occurs most frequently in
occupational settings where workers are exposed to industrial chemicals;
however, even under these circumstances, it is usually difficult, if
not impossible, to quantify the amount of exposure.
Id., (emphasis added). In Westberry, no formal testing for levels of talc in the
plaintiffs workplace was performed; nor was there any medical literature
supporting the proposition that exposure to talc could result in sinus disease.
Yet the court did not allow the lack of that specific evidence to defeat the
plaintiffs claim.
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Similarly, in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller, Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2 nd Cir. 1995,
no evidence was presented with respect to the levels of chemicals from the
"hot-glue" fumes that were present in the plaintiffs workplace prior to her
developing polyps in her throat; nor was there any medical literature that says
glue fumes cause throat polyps. The court nonetheless held that the medical
expert's testimony, which was based upon a differential diagnosis, was reliable
and admissible even in the absence of evidence pertaining to specific exposure
levels. 61 F.3d at 1043-44.
There is evidence, in this case, that the subject workplace had only two
air exchanges per hour from the time the Curix machine was relocated to the
subject workplace in 1993 until 1995, when the ventilation problems in the
workplace were finally addressed with at least some degree of efficacy. This
evidence may be significant, for causation purposes, in light of AGFA's
installation specification requirements, which require at least 10-15 air
exchanges per hour. In addition, there is evidence that there was a "chemical
smell" in the subject workplace during the relevant time frame. [R 1974] The
chemical modules studied by AGFA's service representatives indicate that
adequate ventilation is necessary to prevent negative health effects from
chemical exposure. Similar to the facts in Kannankeril v. Terminix
International Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3 rd Cir. 1997), the only formal testing of the
chemical levels in Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's workplace was performed after
the ventilation problems were remedied and revealed only negligible amounts of
chemical fumes. As the court determined in Kannankeril, any claimed
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shortcoming pertaining to evidence regarding the exposure Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder experienced goes to the credibility and weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility.
In Curtis v. M& S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5 th Cir. 1999), the court
held that the law did not require the plaintiffs in that case to show the precise
level of chemicals to which they were exposed. 174 F.3d at 671 (citing Lakie v.
Smithkline Beecham, 965 F.Supp. 49, 58 (D.D.C. 1997)). In Curtis, the
plaintiffs were exposed to benzene in their workplace. No measurements were
taken of the benzene levels present in the workplace at the time of the
plaintiffs' exposure. In spite of this fact, the court allowed the plaintiffs'
medical expert to testify that the plaintiffs had been exposed to harmful levels
of benzene. The plaintiffs' medical expert based this conclusion on the
symptoms that the plaintiffs were experiencing:
Dr. Stevens found the symptoms experienced by the refinery workers to
be extremely important. He testified that the cluster of symptoms that
the refinery workers began experiencing shortly after HAD was
introduced into the refinery—headache, nausea, disorientation, and
fatigue—are well known symptoms of overexposure to benzene.
174 F.3d at 671. The court found that the plaintiffs' symptoms constituted a
valid basis for Dr. Stevens' conclusion that the plaintiffs were exposed to
harmful levels of benzene and allowed him to so testify.
Governmental and industry standards are, at least as a matter of triable
fact, not scientifically based, and serious injury can result from exposure to
levels below formally promulgated standards. The standards, themselves, are
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not dispositive of the question of whether Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder became ill
by reason of exposure to toxic chemical fumes in their workplace.
Dr. Gray testified that threshold limit values (TLVs) for chemicals are set
by the American Congress of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) and
are not based upon a scientific process, but rather a political process; he has
witnessed TLVs drop significantly over the decades of his medical practice; he
testified that there have been recent allegations that the individual who chaired
the committee that was endorsing threshold limit values was not doing valid
science and has come under serious scrutiny. [R 2070-72] Dr. Gray further
testified that Peak Exposure Levels (PELs) represent the highest level an
individual should be exposed to for a short 10-15 minute time frame within an
eight hour work day. Dr. Gray has witnessed the PEL for lead drop from 60 to
10 over the last twenty years. [R 2072-73] With respect to TLV and PEL levels,
Dr. Gray testified as follows:
My opinion with regard to threshold limit values and PELs with respect
to glutaraldehyde is that with regard to immune function, the agencies
and entities which establish those standards did not adequately
contemplate the interaction of these compounds with the immune
system. And I do not believe that the values that we are seeing
published . . . adequately protect the immune system or people's immune
systems when they are exposed at those levels.
[R 2075]
According to Dr. Gray, none of the standards purporting to reflect safe
exposure levels to chemicals can be relied on "because none of the agencies to
date are using health-based standards when they are establishing acceptable
exposure limits. [R 2076] The only way to ensure a "zero effect" from chemical
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exposure is to have "zero exposure."

[R 2077-78] In Dr. Gray's opinion, if

there is any detectable level of glutaraldehyde or formaldehyde, one cannot
assure a zero effect. [R 2077-78] Furthermore, Dr. Gray believes that there is
no safe level for exposure to hydroquinone. [R 2074]
Dr. Gray believes it is highly significant that Ms. Jones and Ms.
Alder were able to work for so many years in their field without problems
and then, with the relocation of their workplace to a room with
inadequate ventilation, their illnesses and problems began to arise. [R
2089]] Dr. Gray testified that "dose" data pertaining to a patient's chemical
exposure are usually not available, so a physician must rely upon information
in the literature regarding what happens at various dose levels with different
compounds and compare that to the patient's symptoms. [R 2065-67] Dr. Gray
further opined as follows:
If we know for a certainty that the compound is present, regardless of
our ability to quantitate it, we have to be concerned about and be ready
to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the presence of that
compound if characteristic clinical findings are present in the subjects
that we are studying. To do less than that is to be seriously
irresponsible.
[R 2069]
In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized a
similar principle in holding that compliance with building codes did not
necessarily indicate a lack of negligence. Specifically, the Court held:
. . . compliance with the building code does not ipso facto preclude a
finding of a design defect. If a reasonably prudent person should have
known, or could have learned by the exercise of reasonable care, that the
design or construction of the window constituted a dangerous condition,
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the landlord could be held liable for not taking adequate safety
precautions.
699 P.2d at 728. The general principle stated in Williams can be applied
here. AGFA knew, or should by the exercise of reasonable care have known,
that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were getting sick as a result of their exposure to
chemical fumes. Consequently, even if the chemical levels were in compliance
with industry and governmental standards throughout the time of exposure
(something that AGFA cannot prove), that would not relieve AGFA from liability
for failing to take adequate safety precautions in ensuring that adequate
ventilation was being provided in the workplace. As in the commonly and
widely accepted "egg-shell skuir example (see, e.g., Biswell v. Duncan, 742
P.2d 80 (Utah 1987)), a tortfeasor must take its victims as it finds them. Thus,
even if Ms. Jones a n d / o r Ms. Alder were predisposed to being particularly
sensitive to chemicals, that fact does not absolve AGFA from its duty to act
reasonably in addressing Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's workplace ventilation
needs. Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's inability to establish the exact levels of
chemicals to which they were exposed does not preclude their ability to
establish causation, and the trial court's ruling to the contrary is erroneous.
a

ADDITIONAL FACTORS ESTABLISHING CAUSATION.

The temporal relationship between the illnesses at issue and the
relocation of the Curix machine to the room with inadequate ventilation is
evidence of causation. It is well accepted that "a temporal relationship between
exposure to a substance and the onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms
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can provide compelling evidence of causation." Westberry, 178 F.3d at 265
(Emphasis added). See also: Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385, 390.
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had worked as x-ray technologists for many
years with no symptoms of significant illness related to chemical exposure.
Then, after the Curix machine was relocated to the new mammography
department and installed in the room with inadequate ventilation, Ms. Jones
and Ms. Alder both began to experience such symptoms. At first, Ms. Jones'
and Ms. Alder's symptoms would disappear within a few hours after leaving
their workplace and would return within a few hours of returning to their
workplace. 9 As time went on, however, the symptoms became constant and
did not dissipate after an extended period of time away from the workplace.
The fact that both women were experiencing the same phenomenon (albeit with
some variations in their exact symptoms), at the same time, and only upon the
relocation of the Curix machine to the unventilated room, may fairly be
considered compelling evidence of causation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the District Court's ruling, AGFA owed, under one or more
theories, duties of care to Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones. Contrary to the District
Court's ruling, triable questions of fact on the pertinent illness causation
issues prevented the District Court from correctly granting summary judgment.
9

Similarly, in Westberry, (discussed at pages 34, 35 and 43, above) Dr. Isenhower
experimented with keeping Mr. Westberry out of work and noticed that his sinus condition
improved when he was not working but worsened when he returned. Under these
circumstances, the court concluded "that the temporal relationship between Westberry's
exposure and the onset and worsening of his sinus disease provided support for Dr.
Isenhower's opinion that talc was the source of the problem. 178 F.3d at 265.
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Ms. J o n e s ' a n d Ms. Alder's treating health care providers (with one exception Dr. Pompa - medical doctors), a s well a s their non-treating medical expert, Dr.
Cullen, have scientifically valid, important, and admissible things to say about
these women, whose careers were cut short a n d who have been gravely
damaged through no fault of their own. Ms. J o n e s and Ms. Alder urge the
Court, based on the foregoing analysis, and in the interest of justice, to reverse
the District court's granting of s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t and to r e m a n d this case for
trial.
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ADDENDUM

' ™ I L W . H I I , , I C T COURT
Third Judicial District

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPAR
LESLIE ALDER and JACKIE JONES,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
MILES, INC., a corporation, AGFA
CORPORATION, a corporation, and BAYER
CORPORATION, a corporation

CASE NO. 950907675
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

Defendants.

On September 26,2000 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above
entitled Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Defendants were represented by
Gordon Roberts, David Bennion and Stephen Traflet and plaintiffs were represented by Peter Collins
and Jackie Carmichael. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement.
In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four elements to state a claim of negligence: " (1) a duty
of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation,
both actually and proximately, of the injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff."
Weber v Springville City, 725 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1986). Consequently, summary judgment is
appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, because
the complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial." Schafir vHarrigan 879 P.2d 1384 (1994)(citing, Celotex Corp.

- - ^ J O

v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)). Plaintiffs fail to establish several
elements essential to their claim of negligence. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary
judgment is granted.
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty of reasonable care. "Absent a showing
of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover." Sliszev Stanley-Bostich 979 P.2d 317 (1999) (quoting, AMS
Salt Indus. V. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942P.2d315, 319 (Utah 1997)). Plaintiffs fail to prove that
defendants had a duty to control the operation or installation of the ventilation system. Furthermore,
plaintiffs fail to persuade this Court that any legally cognizable duty, sufficient to support a claim
of negligence, exists between the plaintiffs and defendant.
Another critical element of a negligence claim is causation. In this case, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving both that they were exposed to chemicals and that the levels of exposure causes
known toxic effects. At the hearing and in supporting memorandum plaintiffs fail to meet this
burden. Specifically, plaintiffs are unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone levels
known to cause known toxic effects.
Finally, to prevail in a negligence claim, plaintiffs must prove damages. Plaintiffs assert that
repeated chemical exposure caused them to develop significant health problems, primarily, Multiple
Chemical Sensitivity, or "MCS"1. MCS is a controversial diagnosis that has been excluded in
numerous jurisdictions for lack of sound scientific reasoning and methodology. See generally,
Bradley v Brown 42 F.3d 434 (1994), Summers v Missouri Pacific Railroad System 132 F.3d 599

*In addition to MCS, Dr. Deborah Robinson, diagnosed both plaintiffs with chronic
fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia while Dr Janiece Pompa diagnosed plaintiff Jones with
cognitive deficits. These diagnoses appear to essentially be MCS couched in different terms.
Plaintiffs own experts admits that all of the illnesses display nearly identical symptoms and show
significant overlap in numerous other respects.
i, ,L v., J ;

(1997), Collins v Welch 178 Misc.2d 107, Treadwell vDow-United Technologies 970 F. Supp 974
(M.D.Ala. 1997). Furthermore, numerous medical organizations, including the American Medical
Association, refuse to accept MCS as a valid and reliable diagnosis. After careful consideration,
this Court concludes that plaintiffs evidence and testimony offered in support of MCS is not
admissible. Plaintiffs evidence is not based upon inherently reliable scientific or medical foundation
as required under Rimmasch and Utah Rules of Evidence 702. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to
establish the existence of damages, an element essential to their claim of negligence.
Therefore, for the above mentioned reasons, the Court having reviewed the legal memoranda,
affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, concludes that plaintiff has
failed to prove a legal cause of action for negligence and accordingly defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment should be granted.

Dated this

j
y

&£**
day of^rfy, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 950907675 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

PETER C. COLLINS
ATTORNEY PLA
623 East 2100 South
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106
GORDON L. ROBERTS
ATTORNEY DEF
201 SOUTH MAIN, # 1800
P.O. BOX 45898
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841450898
STEPHEN G TRAFLET
ATTORNEY DEF
Carriage Court Two
264 South Street
Morristown NJ 07960
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